The Pro-Choice Left is a Lot Like Christopher Columbus

And now, for Early Morning Shower Thoughts That Will Piss All Sorts of Different People Off:
The majority of the pro-choice left is a lot like Christopher Columbus.
They’ve arrived at a really cool new place…! That isn’t actually all that new because entire populations of ethicists have been residing there for quite some time.
They also seem to believe they’ve arrived at some place called Absolute Moral Superiority, despite the local population insisting that if such a place exists, someone REALLY screwed up on navigation, and they must have fallen shot of their target destination by a few thousand miles, because this place is actually We’re Pretty Confident We Have It Right And Here’s Why. 
Now, the ethicists of We’re Pretty Confident We Have It Right And Here’s Why have been very excited by the new arrival of the pro-choice left, and eager to share local resources like arguments, rationales, well crafted metaphors, and even teach them how to practice respectful discourse. But the pro-choice left seems only partially interested in these things, and are much more intrigued by the prospect of exploiting and polluting the local land for their own means, reducing robust arguments and rationales to dangerously unsustainable humorous little anecdotal aphorisms they can share with each other and giggle over, content with having arrived at Absolute Moral Superiority. 
As it turns out, the pro-choice left isn’t actually even all that convinced of the inherent worth of the practices of the native ethicists. They come from a long and established culture of science and scientific reasoning that’s produced astounding accomplishments and feats, and so to them, through the lens of cultural superiority, they see the native ethicists interest in working through the issues in a lengthy and robust manner as quaint, archaic, and perhaps even dismiss the ethicists as being uncultured savages. In their minds, there’s no reason to trade and share arguments when science and scientists can arbitrate everything flawlessly. 
Now that I’ve beaten that extended metaphor to death, I should take a moment to say I hope no one interprets this as trivializing the barbarity and genocide carried out by early American settlers against Native American populations. Next to slavery and the Japanese internment camps, that has to be the darkest and most bleakly unredeemable part of American history. This was just a silly extended metaphor to humorously vent my frustration with the overly simplistic treatment of a very complex issue at the hands of the majority of pro-choice activists, pieced together at 6:30 in the morning while in the shower chuckling to myself. 

Have a nice day, and do rhetoric a favor and don’t oversimplify the issues you care about. 

Rubbish Recycled Rhetoric #2: The M&M Argument

You’ve seen it a thousand times. In all likelihood, you’ve probably seen it employed by vastly different demographics. Which I find amazingly strange, because one would think that when on the receiving end of this utterly worthless reductive argument, one immediately and intuitively realizes just how deeply flawed it is. So I can see why one would then turn it around and wield it ironically, reductio ad absurdum, as a joke.

But then to use it seriously? To have the stupid thing proliferate through internet discourse? It’s completely unfathomable to me.

So let’s get to it. It looks something like this:

Or, it goes like this:

Or maybe, like this:

You get the idea.

This “argument,” if you can call it that without gagging, is used and abused by tons of people in very different camps, all the time. It’s another classic piece of rubbish recycled rhetoric, something that gets slapped on an image that can be circulated and go viral when people see it and already agree so they hit the share button, because simple arguments don’t make brain go ow.

Let’s examine the point, with an ounce of charity, to boil down what it’s trying to get across.

The Attempted Point:

You have a sample of a thing, say X, and a smaller number of that larger sample, Y, is hazardous in some way. The numbers seem to vary a bit depending on who’s using them (10%, or apparently even 0.1%) in terms of wha portion of the sample in question is hazardous. The supposition here is that even if the hazardous sample is incredibly small, you’ll hesitate to take a random sample of the larger sample when you’re playing with your life (the implication being eating a poisoned M&M kills you, I suppose).

Now, if I haven’t made it clear already, I’m really having a hard time believing I really even need to write this post. It’s frankly somewhat shocking that it’s not so patently obvious how shitty this argument is that people wouldn’t immediately realize and abandon it. But, much to my continued dismay, and to the continued knee-capping of social discourse, it still lives. And especially since it’s so egregiously bad, there’s a duty here to dismantle it, for the good of our ability to reason as a society. Sigh.

Why It’s Garbage

10% isn’t very much. There’s a decent chance that in any sample of just about anything, that 10% of that sample sucks. So, let’s go reductio ad absurdum first. You basically just need a stereotype, and you stick it in the formula, and ta-dah, you have your stereotype affirming BS argument.

1. You say not all white kids are school shooters? Imagine a bowl of M&M’s. 10% of them are poisoned. Go ahead, eat a handful. Not all M&M’s are poison, and not all white kids are school shooters.
2. You say not all conservatives want to shoot up abortion clinics? M&M’s
3. You say not all conservatives are closet racists? M&M’s.
4. You say not all liberals want to ban all guns? M&M’s.
5. You say not all cops want to kill black people? M&M’s.
6. You say not all black people want to kill cops in retaliation? M&M’s.
7. You say not all black people are criminals? M&M’s.

I hope you get the picture. This rhetoric can be used to apply to literally any stereotype about a general demographic you can think of. It’s basically a catch-all argument for stereotyping. And therefore bigotry. Last time I checked, bigotry was bad. Following?

Second approach. How about that .1% huh? That’s a really, really low number. Are we really going to balk at that? I can maybe understand, theoretically, not wanting to play Russian roulette with a 10 chamber gun. But one bad apple in a thousand? Let’s take a minute and look at some statistics, for perspective.

(Source: http://www.nsc.org/learn/safety-knowledge/Pages/injury-facts-chart.aspx)

So, if we’re not risking anything with more than a 1/1,000 chance of death, don’t get in a car. Or on a motorcycle. In fact, don’t go near roads, since lots of pedestrians are killed. Don’t keep any sharp objects or pills in the house, because you just might off yourself. Also you sure as shit better switch to an all kale and quinoa diet, because heart disease and cancer, damn. Just to be safe, don’t go near any body of water, since drowning is pretty darn close to 1/1000 deaths.

Look, goofy statistics aside, the point is you take risks in your life every day when you get out of bed. Hell there’s probably a pretty small statistical chance that getting out of bed will kill you, and you do that a whole lot. Maybe you should stop risking that, since you risk your life every time you do.

Life is risk, folks. There are no 100% safety assurances on anything. And if that’s what you want, go lock yourself in a rubber room and strap into your bubble suit.

I really hope that’s about enough to wrap this up. But do me a favor, next time you see anyone, regardless of whether you happen to agree with their point, use this argument, tell them it’s BullShit and they shouldn’t be using it. Because it’s bad rationale, and every time it’s used it enables other people to use it as a form of rhetoric for some equally shitty point. Even if you happen to be using it to support a otherwise tenable position, using it alone is an issue.

If you’re too lazy to explain why the argument is shit, just copy the link to this post on the person’s stupid picture or comment. I don’t mind the site traffic.

Rubbish Ranking:

I’ve also decided that if I keep going forward with these types of posts, I’m going to start ranking how shitty these pieces of rhetoric are. Factors in their shittiness are as follows:

1. How prevalent is the rhetoric? The more common it is, the worse the ranking.
2. How shitty is the argument? Is it never usable? Would it be alright in some circumstances, but sometimes it’s misused?
3. How much overall impact and damage does the rhetoric have on people’s likelihood to think through the issue?

So, without further ado, I give The M&M Argument:

“A Blight on Human Discourse!” This godforsaken thing is horribly common, and even when the position it’s supposedly defending is solid, it does damage. It not only stops people from thinking, but encourages people to use stereotyping and hasty generalization as methods of evaluating problems. Huge no-no.

I’m also going to retro-actively go back and rate Rubbish Recycled Rhetoric #1: “Nobody Blamed the Lightsaber” so go ahead and check that out if you haven’t already.

 

Rubbish Recycled Rhetoric #1: “Nobody Blamed The Lightsaber”

Hello non-existent readers. It’s been ages since I posted anything here, and long enough that perusing my old posts makes me cringe at the titles alone. Partially to comfort myself, I’d like to reaffirm that while my jimmies occasionally do get rustled and thereby prompt a salty post here, everything I write is backed primarily by a motivation to spark reasonable discourse. Disgusted by something I wrote a few years ago? In all likelihood, me too. Drop a comment and we can talk about how shitty some of those older posts are.

Moving forward, I’m going to be starting (attempting to start) a new post series that I think has some potential, and is important to me given the goal of this blog. In this post I’ll both pitch this new post series and its goals, and offer my first prompt on the topic. Here’s the pitch.

This day and age, while nothing “new,” it seems we’re becoming increasingly likely to let others do our thinking for us. Clever little visual puns and one-liner “arguments” float around on pictures that are shared on social media, as if a substitute for robust intellectual discussion, or at least sufficient to drive the sharer’s proposed point home. 99% of the time, the rhetoric being used on these types of posts, is utter garbage. There are very few intelligent nuanced and robust arguments on complex issues that can be reduced to half a sentence. If you find one that really does work, treat it like a diamond, because they’re way more rare than those.

The point is, more often than not, these argument pacifiers of sorts are floating around and blinding people with contentment. They’re stopping real conversations short at horribly oversimplified and watered down points, feeding an unwillingness to think and encounter things that we disagree with. We see ones we already agree with, chuckle over the pun or simplicity of it and our own intellectual superiority, hit the share and/or like button, and done.

That’s legitimately dangerous for intellectualism, and any hopes for reaching real understanding and conclusions on important issues. 

Rarely, someone will see the post and comment, prompting a real discussion, which is the goal, in which case, great. But when we become complacent with these pre-packaged pieces of putrid pontification (don’t judge me I needed a P word) we’re killing discourse in its crib. And when we kill discourse in its crib, we breed an ignorant stubborn populace. And when we breed an ignorant stubborn populace, society breaks down. Basically bad things happen, and we should push against these.

So, without further ado, the first Rubbish Recycled Rhetoric:

The point here is pretty clear and simple (as it always is): light sabers don’t slaughter defenseless innocents, Jedi tripping balls do. It’s a ham fisted argument by analogy to “guns don’t kill people, people kill people. Don’t blame the instrument, blame the culprit.”

For those that haven’t seen the Star Wars movies (it’s okay, they’re not even actually that good, everyone is just nostalgia’d blind) this is a scene in which the main character has been blinded by emotional desperation and turns to the Dark Side under the guide of the bad guy of the series who has him slaughtering all the Jedi, which included small children in training. He does go through with it.

The supposition runs like this: Anakin is now a Bad Guy, and no one wants to ban light sabers, they just want to stop the Bad Guy. So, extending it to real life, we should just be trying to stop Bad Guys, not banning guns.

The problem is, the analogy doesn’t function to deliver the desired conclusion, which is to push against gun control.

Light sabers in the Star Wars universe are presumably pretty heavily regulated pieces of equipment. You can’t just go and buy one from Star-Mart. As featured in the very picture being shared, you’re obligated to start training as a very small child under the direct supervision of Jedi masters. You dedicate your life to becoming a master of the weapon, and learning the Jedi code, which includes pretty stringent ethical requirements.

Anakin was even banned from becoming a Jedi in Episode 1, because he was fearful for his mother. Yoda (little green Jedi master guy with funny grammar), in a famous scene, suggests:

And thus bans tiny 8-12 year old little Anakin from becoming a Jedi, and thus, obtaining a light saber. Simply because he was afraid.

This means that light sabers are crazy more regulated in the Star Wars universe than guns are in ours.

But hey, if you want some 900 year old dude looking into the heart of children when they’re 10 to decide whether they’re allowed to own a gun, requiring that they must dedicate their lives to a prescribed moral code and way of life surrounding protecting others, I’m on board.

On the other hand, if you want to make a point about how guns don’t kill people and therefore shouldn’t be punished when someone does something bad with them, Star Wars is NOT the model you want to use to illustrate your point.

Rubbish Ranking:

So, all that being said, the idea behind the argument isn’t in itself horrible. I mean, it’s not great, but it’s not inherently flawed. To suggest that one ought not blame a tool, but instead the agent using it works in some situations. Even if it were used in a better scenario, it’s not strong enough to stand on its own, and would need some serious heavy lifting performed by other pieces of argument. So this piece of recycled rhetoric could be worse. Rubbish ranking?

Go ahead, read it in the voice. I won’t stop you.

It’s primarily an issue of a really bad example used to back a shady-at-best piece of reasoning. The reasoning itself could theoretically be augmented by a better argument, but Star Wars and lightsabers were really not the route to go. Better luck next time. Just remember, there is no “try.”

A Rebuttal to the States’ Rights Motivated Argument Against Marriage Equality

The Supreme Court ruling finding Same Sex Marriage (from here on out, SSM) bans unconstitutional has unsurprisingly sparked a great deal of “debate” (using the term loosely). While some opponents to the decision don’t bother to hide the fact that the motivation for, and only reasoning behind their opposition is homophobia, others have taken to the only available counter argument worthy of a response shorter than a link to a Wikipedia article defining a logical fallacy. That argument hinges on the right of a state within the country to self govern in such a way that reflects popular opinion within their boundary. So, the argument runs, it’s an unacceptable violation of this right for the federal government to impose a ruling that goes against popular opinion in a given state. Please note here that this is the strongest formation of the argument I have come across, and if a stronger one is encountered, please feel free to provide it. I have no intention of fighting against a mere straw man.

Taken out of the context of SSM, we can see how this argument might run and come out with a reasonable conclusion. Let’s take scrapple. Scrapple is a widely popular dish within Pennsylvania, but outside of the state’s boundaries, is often seen as disgusting and repulsive (the Wikipedia article linked above does describe its main ingredients as “mush of pork,” so there may be some merit to finding scrapple repulsive). Let’s imagine that for whatever reason, the federal government decided to ban the selling and consuming of scrapple (perhaps simply because they found it disgusting). The state of Pennsylvania and its citizens would have a reasonable case for finding this ruling problematic. Sure, the federal government might find scrapple repulsive, perhaps even the rest of the world might find scrapple repulsive, but in PA popular opinion favors scrapple, and a federal ruling against it seems invasive and unnecessary.

This analogy to scrapple, weak as it is, at least provides some clarity on the functionality of the states’ rights argument (from here on out, SRA). Alas, as might be gleaned from the analogy, the argument only functions properly so long as there is no ethical justification for the ban imposed by the federal government. This is to say that SRA hinges on the condition that the argument/ruling/legislation it attacks is a matter of subjective opinion, and that no substantive argument can otherwise be provided for or against the position.

Going back to our scrapple example, a person may like scrapple, or they may find it repulsive. But any arguments one might fashion to defend either view are merely subjective, and appeal to a matter of taste (“I find the texture of scrapple pleasing!” “Scrapple looks unappetizing, and the ingredients used to make it are disgusting!”). No real objective stance can be taken here, and thus it’s reasonable to appeal to popular opinion.

When dealing with any argument where morality is concerned, however, the SRA can be torn apart like wet tissue paper. Doing so, for the most part, requires only an imagination for moral unpleasantries that might be permitted in a given jurisdiction via popular opinion. In this way, the SRA is very comparable to moral subjectivism, the belief that morality is merely a matter of opinion, and may vary widely from one culture to another. This connection is why I will provide a lengthy counter argument to show why the SRA is fundamentally flawed in its application to marriage equality, or any other moral matter.

I. The Segregation Analogy

For those of you that will need the least convincing, I’ll start with a very simple analogy that will sufficiently demonstrate the weakness of the SRA and moral relativism in relation to the SCOTUS ruling on SSM. This analogy will demonstrate, via reductio ad absurdum, that accepting the SRA’s application to moral issues (and to a lesser extent, moral relativism) leads to absurd and untenable consequences, and therefore ought to be rejected.

De jure segregation during the 20^th century was presumably backed by a very large degree of public opinion. Racism was wildly rampant, and it’s reasonable to suppose that many Americans were not only in favor of racial segregation, but saw blacks as fundamentally inferior to whites. And yet, through Supreme Court decision, overtime the country began to realize the moral error that had been made.

While the Supreme Court decision itself did not sway the hearts and minds of Americans, leaving many opposed to the newfound recognition that “separate is inherently unequal,” it nonetheless passed. It would be plausible, if one is to accept SRA as a premise, to say that states rights to self govern according to popular opinion within their boarders was infringed by the banning of racial segregation. Surely there were a number of southern states where the majority favored segregation, and yet it was banned.

If SRA and its application to moral ideas is accepted as a premise, it should still be morally permissible for states to racially segregate if this is what voters in a given state prefer.

Exempt the remaining vehement racists in this country (a large enough number still remain, unfortunately), I think most will recognize that the consequences of SRA when applied here are tremendously problematic. We recognize now that segregation was in fact morally wrong, and based merely on racist sentiments with no real backing. SRA must be rejected in this case.

One might attempt to grant here that SRA must be rejected in its application to racial segregation, but contend that SSM is sufficiently different from segregation such that SRA should still apply. Arguments attempting to draw this distinction between the two cases, so that SRA is still applicable to SSM without being applicable to segregation, are bound to fail. The two cases are sufficiently similar such that if one rules in favor that SRA is not applicable to one case, the same decision must apply to the other.

Both present an instance where a SCOTUS decision ruled that a practice was unconstitutional. Both present an instance where a demographic were/are treated as second-class citizens with fewer rights because of something they can’t change about themselves. Both present an instance where bigotry was the only motivation behind a practice.

Now, in order to attempt to draw a distinction between the two cases, one would have to provide an argument as to why SSM is morally wrong. If this could be done, it would sufficiently separate SSM from racial segregation, and perhaps not only allow the SRA to function so that states ought to be able to decide whether SSM is permissible within their boundaries, but push back in favor of a federal banning of SSM. After all, if something can be proven to be morally wrong, it ought not to be done, and if it ought not to be done, it is reasonable to suppose that one might favor a legal prohibition.

Prohibition against an equal treatment for one demographic under the law, taken in abstract form, is uncontroversially morally reprehensible. If the law were to prevent the granting of rights to people with blonde hair, or people who enjoyed scrapple, for instance, we would not hesitate to call the law unjust. There is no difference here. I will say again, this is an instance of a demographic being given unequal rights under the law because of something about them they cannot change. The banning of the rights that come with a legal marriage license to a demographic of citizens is unjust.

The first set of “arguments” that I will deal with that attempt to draw this distinction between the two cases and show that SSM is morally wrong are religious ones. As I’ll explain in the next section, there is sufficient reason to regard “religious arguments” as something of an oxymoron, especially as applied to law. The second set of “arguments” that I will deal with are secular ones. These arguments are almost entirely logically flawed, or just generally too weak to put any pressure on SSM. Finally, I’ll deal with moral relativism as a general principle to supplement this section, and show that one cannot forward the SRA in regard to moral issues, as doing so would lead to tremendously undesirable consequences.

II. Why Religious “Arguments” are Irrelevant

In order for an argument to be sound, it must contain true premises. In order for premises to be “true,” they must be objectively true. Religious arguments hinge on religious principles of various kinds and use them as premises to defend their conclusions. Religious principles are by their very definition, non-objective.

Religion, in its essence, is based on faith and belief, not fact, and not evidence. Faith and belief have no value in argument, as they are non-objective. As non-objective values, their truth as premises cannot be verified. This means that even upon completing a valid argument, soundness can never be granted so long as the argument includes religious principles. Defending against a religious argument is as simple as “Well that may be true for you, because you believe in X, but since I do not, your argument does not apply to me.”

We can see clearly how this functions in relation to SSM. A Christian, for example, may well be able to establish a valid argument that hinges on interpretation of some bible passage or another, but at the end of the day, so long as the audience for the argument is not Christian, the argument has no weight. The premises remain unverifiable, and thus, the argument is unsound. This is why no argument against SSM that contains subjective premises derived from religion is tenable.

As an additional counter argument, one need only brush up on Plato’s Euthyphro, which contains one of the most famous counter arguments against the relevance of religious principle in evaluating morality. For those unfamiliar, the text is centered around a young man named Euthyphro, who intends to prosecute his father for manslaughter. Euthyphro encounters Socrates, and the two discuss the morality of such an action, and Euthyphro attempts to defend himself to Socrates. Socrates challenges Euthyphro to define piety, as Euthyphro has claimed that prosecuting his father is pious.

Euthyphro’s third attempt at defining piety, and thus justifying his action as morally permissible, appeals to religion. Euthyphro suggests that piety is what is pleasing to (all of the) god(s), such that what is pleasing to them/Him is pious, and what He/they hate is impious. It is here that Socrates asks the question relevant to our conversation: “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?”

While I encourage the reading of the original text and a study of its interpretation to have the full effect, I will briefly summarize what this question means for religious arguments. Socrates sets up two possibilities, either (1) something is moral because God loves it, or (2) God loves things that are moral.

If (1) is true, and a thing becomes moral only because God loves it, the definitions of morality are arbitrary. What’s to stop God from changing His mind, thus rendering something previously moral, now immoral, or vice versa? If (1) is true, morality is left to seem deeply unsatisfying. If (2) is true, then there is some deeper reason for why a given thing is moral or immoral, as God’s love or distaste for the action has something to do with the action itself, not merely because of God’s arbitration.

This, in effect, means that relying on religious principles to justify a vision of morality does not provide the whole picture of why a given action is moral or immoral. It would instead provide a mere anecdote, and the root of the issue is left untouched. Justification of an argument that attempts to show that an action is moral or immoral, cannot rely on religious principles, for this reason.

III. Other Flawed Secular Arguments Against SSM

There exist a wide variety of secular “arguments” (again, using the term loosely) against SSM, but they are all deeply flawed, or patently fallacious. I’ll list a few of them here, with short explanations of their flaws and thus grounds for their outright dismissal.

“If SSM is permissible, then there are no grounds to prevent polygamy, bestiality, incest, or pedophilia!”: This argument runs a classic slippery slope argument, which is fallacious so long as evidence is not provided which makes the inference reasonable. A slippery slope argument seeks to show that if one action happens, a second (or series) of undesirable consequences will inevitably follow. The first issue with slippery slope arguments generally speaking is that it is tremendously difficult to argue that a set of consequences are necessitated by an action. Such a proof requires a very high burden of evidence to become plausible. Non-fallacious slippery slope arguments do exist, but one needs to clearly establish that the first action has lead to certain consequences in all (or nearly all) other cases. With respect to SSM giving way to bestiality etc, the evidence to support the slippery slope argument does not exist. In fact, there is evidence to the contrary. Many countries, including the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Canada, South Africa, Norway, Sweden, Portugal, Iceland, Denmark, Brazil, France, Uruguay, New Zealand, the UK, Luxembourg, Finland, and Ireland all legally permit SSM. Very few of these countries legally permit bestiality, for example. To show an inevitable link from SSM to bestiality, one would need all, or quite nearly all countries that have legalized SSM to have also legalized bestiality. This is not the case, so the argument falls flat.

Additionally, there are two counter arguments that work to effectively separate SSM from the myriad of other problematic cases. The first counter argument runs on consent. With SSM, there is consent between both rational, autonomous agents, who choose willingly to engage in an activity between the two of them. Via any number of moral theories, consent between two parties engaged in an activity that affects no other parties is permissible. Any challenge here would need to show that the activity being performed adversely affected others who had not consented to the activity, perhaps via the Sanctity of Marriage Argument, which I’ll cover later.

The second counter argument might be aptly named the “why do you give a shit” argument. This argument anticipates rebuttals to the consent argument, where one might take issue with the practices of consenting parties. Using polygamy this time as an example, let’s suppose one worries that SSM will lead to polygamy. Assuming that all parties involved in the polyamorous marriage are consenting, why is polygamy problematic? If your answer has something to do with the sanctity of marriage, see the next section. If your answer has something to do with undesirable consequences of polygamy for those involved, I refer you again to the consent argument. Adults may willingly consent to take on risks associated with actions, and if entering a polygamous marriage presents a number of emotional or medical risks, there is no reason to see these risks any different from consenting to skydiving, or boxing.

“If SSM is permissible, the sanctity of marriage will be destroyed!” The very concept of sanctity ties very closely to religious principles, so for the most part I’ll refer you to the previous section regarding religious arguments. Taking this counter as an exclusively secular argument, referring to the “institution” of marriage, or perhaps the health of other marriages in a given country, I’m afraid I can do little more than scoff. Prior to the federal legalization of SSM, was marriage really a sacred institution otherwise unscathed? What about these issues? 1, 2, 3, 4,

Furthermore, I might refer you back to the “why do you give a shit” argument, in the sense that I fail to see how what two (or more) people consent to has any impact on your marriage, or marriage as a concept or institution. When little children pretend to be married to one another as a game, does this disrespect and damage the institution of marriage? If one thinks that marriage is such an important institution, I’d hope that it’s strong enough to withstand child’s play, and general misuse at the hands of others. Even if you find SSM somehow distasteful (because you’re a homophobe), it remains unclear on how two men or two women getting married has an impact on heterosexual marriage as a concept.

“What about the children!?”: What about them? The suggestion here is that SSM leading to same sex couples raising children will damage them and their development. Proponents of this argument will sometimes attempt to cite studies that there is not enough evidence to prove that there isn’t a substantive difference in children raised by homosexual and heterosexual couples. So, let’s suppose for sake of argument that there is in fact a lack of evidence to show whether there is a difference, or more importantly if active damage is done to children raised by two men or by two women. Why suppose that there’s an issue here at all? Sure, lacking the evidence that there isn’t a difference isn’t enough to say for a matter of fact that there isn’t, but what would lead one to assume that there is? The answer, inevitably, is homophobic tendencies and cultural ideals that place undue value on heterosexual parenting.

But, let’s ignore the motivations of the argument to be fair to it. Until there is evidence that gives us reason to worry that homosexual parenting damages children in a way that heterosexual parenting does not, I fail to see why the issue is being raised. It’s a bit like worrying that not eating a healthy balanced breakfast as a child will lead to becoming a serial killing communist pedophile. Is it possible that failure to eat a balanced breakfast as a child will lead to becoming a serial killing communist pedophile? Sure! Is there evidence, or any reason to spark a worry about this? Um…

IV. The High Price Tag of Moral Relativism

Let’s suppose you’ve read through all of this, and still aren’t convinced. Following the SRA, and placing an incredibly high value on democracy and people’s ability to self-govern (which, perhaps you should come to realize, also means your ability to control your next-door neighbor, and his ability to control you. This isn’t about freedom and liberty and autonomy like you think it is. If it were, and you and your neighbor had no business telling each other how to live, you would be in favor of SSM), you still think states should be able to decide for themselves whether to permit SSM, because some people don’t like it but still think it’s immoral, and if gay couples don’t like it, they can move to another state where it’s allowed.

What you’re espousing is essentially moral relativism. As a reminder, this is the belief that morality is subjective, and a given culture or group of people should be able to set their own standards for what is and isn’t morally permissible. You’re suggesting that because some people find SSM distasteful or claim that it’s immoral, they should be able to decide within their own communities whether or not to permit it. So, if popular opinion within a community finds SSM “immoral,” that community can rightfully ban SSM.

Spoiler alert: Your old friend reductio ad absurdum is about to rear its ugly head again. Moral relativism has incredibly ugly entailments when accepted wholesale. This section will be nothing more than a fun little list of the cans of worms opened up by accepting moral relativism, by imagining a given community (I’ll call it community X, but one can imagine the Deep South or an alternate reality where Nazi Germany won WWII, if one prefers)

1. Community X agrees by popular opinion that black people are a stain on humanity and should be eradicated. They proceed to lynch every black person they can find. Adhering to moral relativism and as an outsider to community X, you have no grounds with which to protest their actions.
2. Community X agrees by popular opinion that homosexuals are a stain on humanity and should be eradicated. They proceed to lynch every homosexual they can find. Adhering to moral relativism and as an outsider to community X, you have no grounds with which to protest their actions.
3. Community X agrees by popular opinion that blondes are dumb, and whores, and shouldn’t reproduce. They proceed to have every blonde either lynched, or forcibly sterilized so they can’t reproduce. Adhering to moral relativism and as an outsider to community X, you have no grounds with which to protest their actions.
4. Community X agrees by popular opinion that Jewish people are a stain on humanity and should be eradicated. They proceed to lynch every Jewish person they can find. Adhering to moral relativism and as an outsider to community X, you have no grounds with which to protest their actions.
5. Community X agrees by popular opinion that it’s super fun to light 10 year old girls on fire for the mere pleasure of watching them burn. Once a month, they proceed to light 10 year old girls they select at random. Adhering to moral relativism and as an outsider to community X, you have no grounds with which to protest their actions.
6. (This one goes out to the people who took issue with section III) Community X agrees by popular opinion that goats make the best bed partners. They proceed to “breed” as many goats as they can to “breed” with. Adhering to moral relativism and as an outsider to community X, you have no grounds with which to protest their actions.
7. Community X agrees by popular opinion that homophobic people are a stain on humanity and should be eradicated. They proceed to lynch every homophobic person they can find. Adhering to moral relativism and as an outsider to community X, you have no grounds with which to protest their actions.
8. Community X agrees by popular opinion that racists are a stain on humanity and should be eradicated. They proceed to lynch every racist they can find. Adhering to moral relativism and as an outsider to community X, you have no grounds with which to protest their actions.

The list goes on, and is limited only by your imagination, as I’m sure you can see at this point. Moral relativism has very, very ugly repercussions, and cannot be accepted as a premise. This means that moral relativism cannot be used to support the SRA, and any iteration of the SRA that banks on moral relativism ought to be outright rejected.

How To Deconstruct Demands on Masculinity

As a forewarning, this post is actually more prescriptive than it is argumentative. There is little argument within this post, and instead it’s a suggestion on a method of social change. Of course, as always, it’s open for debate. That’s the whole point. So pick apart as you will and discuss. But the goal of the post is to define a method for pulling apart how society dictates men should act, and what it means to be a man. Incidentally, it’s also about pulling apart patriarchy, which is the force that places demands and constraints on what it means to “be a man.”

It’s surprisingly simple a project for the individual. It just requires monitoring of your giving and withholding the one thing patriarchy holds most dear: Respect.

Not this kind of Respect.

By respect, I don’t mean the kind way your grandmother told you that you ought to behave towards strangers. Respect in this context doesn’t mean merely showing politeness towards the people you interact with. It’s not the sock-it-to-me sock-it-to-me just-a-little-bit just-a-little-bit kind of respect we usually think of when we hear the word.

This heartier, more robust sense of the word respect is something we need and use to interact as social creatures. We all naturally crave it and seek it, and loathe when it’s taken from us. It’s the fabric that holds together social convention and norms. It’s how we express our approval and disapproval of certain behaviors, actions, attitudes, and dispositions.

Respect is what you give to the people who impress you when you’re not afraid to show it. Respect is what you withhold from people who disappoint or offend you and you want them to know it.

You don’t “owe” this kind of respect to anyone, it’s yours to giveth and taketh awayeth as you please. And you already do it all the time, according to certain values you hold about what kind of behaviors, actions, attitudes, and dispositions you think are admirable, and which ones you find distasteful.

And you express this giving and taking of respect according to those laws all the time. The people you give and take it form usually know you’re doing it. It can be as simple as a glare to communicate disapproval, applause after a rousing speech, a nod of agreement, or folded arms and furrowed brows of disappointment.

Hegemony…?

Now the best thing about hegemonic masculinity is that it is predicated upon earning the most respect from the most people. A successful machismo hegemonic male will do the best to impress the most, “women want to be with him, and men want to be him,” as the saying goes. While all (or almost all) human beings are creatures driven by the need and desire for this kind of respect and approval, hegemonic masculinity stresses respect’s importance far further than just about anywhere else in society. A “Man” is someone who sleeps with lots of women, because this reinforces to him that lots of women desire him, and thus, respect him. A “Man” is someone who is physically intimidating and not afraid to show it, because physical prowess can mean the threat of violence which means keeping dissenters in line by intimidation. A “Man” is someone who controls the room and the room’s conversation when he’s in it, because everyone wants to hear what he has to say because his voice is the one that matters the most, because his voice mattering the most means everyone respects him.

Love me? Worship me? Please? It’s cute when it’s a puppy, less so with a secretly attention starved human being.

This makes it remarkably easy to train men who have bought into the system, much the same way you train a puppy dog that just wants you to pet it and give it treats. You scold it and withhold pets and treats when it does things you don’t like, and you give it a little pat on the head when it comes when it’s called. Whoever said men weren’t dogs? At least, the ones who’ve bought into the power structures of patriarchy, and are desperate to earn affection and respect through demonstrating power and dominance via the prescribed social definitions of masculinity.

But that’s the brilliant bit. Those definitions of masculinity, the things we reward men for doing and admonish them for doing, are up for debate. They can be changed over time. While thuggish dominance, sexual conquest, and  are what we currently reward men for (thus training them to act as such), we can bend “what it means to be a man” to resemble just about anything.

Chivalry is dead at the moment, because to be chivalrous is to be a ‘white knight,’ and thus, a ‘beta male,’ a meek submissive man said to be hoping to garner affection from women via his ‘feminine’ and ‘girlishly weak’ support for her. But it need not be. We can show respect for chivalry (really just common decency in general) and thus incentivize it, thus pressuring the ‘alpha’ puppy-dog-men to sit-stay-and-play-dead. By which I simply mean that incentivizing common decency will pressure men desperate for those incentives to act decently.

(As a side-note, this does not need to entail broadening the mythic “friend-zone”. Patriarchy has men believing that when they do something good, they’ll be rewarded with romantic affection or sex. Often times this attitude is what people rightly mock white-knights for. Some of them genuinely believe that sticking up for a woman, being a ‘nice guy’ instead of the alternative, means they’re owed sex by society. These attitudes can be admonished just the same as any others. These genuine white knights complain about being friend-zoned and say things like: “I’m a nice guy, but all my female friends do is complain about how they just want to date a nice guy, and none of them want me!”. These kinds of sentiments can be dismissed just the same way as machismo alpha-shit is. You tell the complainer that he’s not owed anything, and that his expecting a reward is pathetic and repulsive. You tell him that he’s not really a ‘nice guy’ if he’s acting in a certain way just for the promise of sex, and that doing so actually makes him just as bad, if not worse, as any other agent of patriarchy.)

Just the same as we can incentivize good behavior, we can admonish bad behavior. Rather than celebrating men who womanize, we can dismiss them. When a friend brags about sexual conquests we can roll our eyes, walk away, or openly mock him. When a man tries to assert physical authority and dominance over another, we can look him in the eye and tell him he’s pathetic, weak, and desperate.

Even when the crowd disagrees, and even when the target individual doesn’t seem to care what you think, those small or large gestures can go a long way. The hegemonic male desperate for respect is watching everyone to ensure he’s earning the maximum amount of it, and when some of it is being withheld, he’ll take notice. And even if he doesn’t the rest of the crowd may. Your individual withholding or offering of respect may force others to question why you’re doing it differently from them.

At first they may mock you for your difference of perspective. You may be a white knight, a beta, a ‘fag’, but some people will hear you. And overtime your values may take root in others, which will inspire more to change. It’s really a grass-roots kind of thing. You just have to be willing to express your approval and disapproval. And you have to remember that when you’re the one doing the distributing or withholding of respect, you’re not the one on trial.

Preventing Teen Suicide? An Unethical Intervention in Autonomy?

Tagging this view onto my previous arguments about Physician Assisted Suicide, I think it’s also important to think about the permissibility of interfering with attempted suicide cases, even though they’re hairy.

I anticipate this topic potentially going to a dark place pretty quickly, especially as my view has to weigh in on teen suicide and similar delicate matters. While I don’t want to offend anyone, I do think it’s an important to address and discuss.

In my previous post, I brought up a potential condition as having a physical component necessary for AE/PE, or at least sufficient age for informed consent. I’m not convinced this is a necessary condition.

I might (or rather, ONE might) argue that suicide of any kind is permissible, regardless of age or suffering threshold, because there’s no reason to interfere in the autonomy of individuals who may wish to take their life. I find this potentially convincing provided it does the necessary work.

I don’t mean to say that we ought to be OKAY with people killing themselves, certainly we should still take measures to raise awareness about teen suicide and the necessary ways to get and offer help to teens in need, but do we really have any right to interfere with someone who wishes to take their own life? Or are our intuitions, which tell us that we ought to stop people from killing themselves, only based in selfish concerns about the loss of a peer/friend/family member/colleague/whatever?

If so, should we really be basing an ethical principle fundamentally concerned with interfering in the bodily autonomy of others (granted this is sts permissible) on grounds related to OUR best interests? This seems quintessentially conflicted to me. Any view that wishes to take issue with a permissive view of suicide HAS to deal only with the best interest of the subject, not those around them (provided no dependents).

Ethical Obligations to Assist Euthanasia

Here’s some more follow-up thinking on Physician Assisted Suicide.

In this post, I will argue that provided sufficient conditions, any individual has a right (a claim on the assistance of others) to euthanasia of any kind. I do not believe this claim on others is restricted to passive euthanasia, in which the subject is merely allowed to die via a foreseen consequence of actions (or non-actions), but includes active euthanasia, in which the subject may ask for the assistance of and thereby obligate others to take action to end his/her life.

While I believe the intend/foresee distinction is a valid one, it will not enter into my post, as I believe both intentional and foreseen killing/euthanasia is permissible. Note I also will not take the time to outline the sufficient conditions for a right to die. While important, this can be argued elsewhere and I do not have the space.

Furthermore, I would argue that because the right to die can obligate others to actively assist in euthanizing, refusing to take part in an active process and force the subject into a situation in which they must await death as a foreseen consequence is unnecessarily cruel.

First, negative argument intended to dismantle objections:
One might argue that a right to death is far too demanding. Granting a claim on the assistance of others seems to unfairly obligate a third party to do something they don’t wish to partake in, violating their autonomy. My response is two-fold.

1. Demanding-ness is Meaningless. While the objector may have a valid concern that such a right is in fact demanding, I fail to see why such demands hamper the strength of my argument. For example, granted Kiddie Pool which was part of one of my recent posts (Walking by kid drowning, low risk to save him, you are obligated to save him), it seems that our intuitions sometimes think that it’s okay for a moral principle to place demands on others. Provided no/minimal risk, as in the case in both Kiddie Pool and active euthanasia, there is a duty to assist people in need, so we ought to think we’re obligated to assist the suffering person seeking assisted euthanasia.

2. This Isn’t About You. A naysayer might object, “Sure, but there’s a difference between Kiddie Pool and AE (active euthanasia)! I don’t have anything against the act of pulling a kid out of a pool, that’s a good action, but killing someone!? I can’t do that!” Let me refer this objection back to the title of this argument. This Isn’t About You. The action itself, be it a killing or letting die, is permissible granted the informed consent of the subject, regardless of whatever feelings you have about the act of killing. Any feelings you may have about the emotional damage you may or may not suffer (The brutalizing of the killer argument?) by assisting in a death are massively outweighed by the subject’s suffering. In short, I’m ambivalent to concerns you have about getting your hands dirty when someone is so miserable they want to die.

Looking at The Elizabeth Bouvia case (explained in more detail later), “Judge John H. Hews … [decided] allowing her to starve herself to death in the hospital would ‘have a profound effect’ on the staff, other patients, and other handicapped people.” This is a miserable reason to assert that someone continue to suffer. The argument, in effect, asserts that the autonomy and wellbeing of Bouvia is less important than the well-being of the people around her, who might be negatively affected. Give me a break. Better yet, give the suffering woman a break.

Now, positive argument in favor of active euthanasia:

Passive Euthanasia Defeats the Purpose. The point of euthanasia is to end/shorten suffering. Does passive euthanasia do this? Our response is mixed. Yes, it does end suffering, but it does not shorten it (case in point Elizabeth Bouvia, who eventually decides she can’t starve herself to death because the side effects would be too costly and actually worsen her suffering, despite her wishes to die). Passive euthanasia (often, in comparison to active) prolongs the very suffering euthanasia seeks to end, seemingly only for the reasons addressed in This Isn’t About You. While the intend/foresee distinction does have significant moral weight, if the very goal of euthanasia is to end/shorten suffering and This Isn’t About You is granted, it seems that PE (passive euthanasia) fails to achieve its goals. It should therefore be rejected in favor of AE.

I think it is important to lay out necessary/sufficient conditions upon which we think that a claim on others for AE is granted, but won’t argue for them here. What’s included is not meant to be an exhaustive list, merely some preliminary ideas that might guide the creation of necessary/sufficient conditions. Such conditions might include:
1. Subject’s inability to perform euthanasia themselves.
2. Physical and emotional suffering, where emotional suffering alone is sts insufficient for AE (physical suffering that does not cause emotional suffering seems unlikely to create a situation in which the subject would ask for AE).
2a. Emotional suffering may be sufficient for AE, should it be great enough, and the subject is of an age where they can make an informed decision (Perhaps above 21? 25? 30?) This quells worries about teen suicide.
3. The lack of dependents – a parent that is still able to provide for his/her children cannot ask for AE (if the parent is no longer providing, perhaps this condition is not necessary)

Provided such conditions are fulfilled, we ought to think AE is preferable to PE, and subjects have a right to demand AE from others.

Right to die? Why not? Physician Assisted Suicide

Long time no post! I’ve decided to get some material on here simply by migrating material from my Biomedical ethics class onto here. I believe it’s appropriate, as it is meant to foster discussion, although it is unlike many of the topics I’ve discussed before.

Without further ado, argument for a position on Physician Assisted Suicide.

A right to die is a very demanding sounding right that the vast majority of people are frequently opposed to. A “right to die” has implicit positive claims on others, that if it is impossible for me to facilitate my own death, I can obligate another to assist in it, should I so desire.

Often times defenders of euthanasia take support weaker rights that don’t put a claim on the assistance of others. I don’t see the need to do so. Here are two cases.

Kiddie Pool: X is walking by his neighbors house when he spots their young child face down in the kiddie pool. The water is shallow, and there is no risk to X, (in terms of his safety, or legal risk) should he choose to assist the child by pulling him out of the pool.

Child in Pain: Bente Hindriks has Hallopeau-Siemens, a rare syndrome that results in a loose external skin layer that peels off easily, causing extreme pain as well as the potential for infection among other things. Hindriks’ parents and doctor have no way of curing the syndrome, but only the option of continuing her suffering until she dies naturally between ages 3-10, or taking measures to euthanize.

Now, I imagine that short Jimmy, the vast majority of people’s intuition about Kiddie Pool is that there is a moral obligation to assist. What is our reason in thinking so? Perhaps there is an obligation because there is no risk of damage to the agent, while an assistance can be given to the child. I’d argue that the same is the case with Child in Pain.

In Child in Pain, an assistance can be given to Hindriks by ending her life and thereby her extreme suffering, knowing that there is no way to ease the suffering should her life continue. Because there is no way to ease the suffering, we should be inclined to say that working to continue her life does not count as an assistance to her, as it does little other than prolong her suffering.

One might object that saving a life and ending a life are dis-analogous types of assistance. I’m inclined to agree. Regardless of this, I think it’s plain to see that between the two choices, keeping Hendriks alive as long as possible or ending her life and her suffering, the latter is the kinder option. Because one is significantly kinder (we might even say the other is cruel), AND there’s no risk to the agent (provided we correctly model our legal system after our ethical system, so that it isn’t legally impermissible to act this way because it’s ethically permissible to act this way) we ought to think that the parents/doctors are obligated to assist in Hindriks death.

Why else might we think that this is wrong?

Perhaps someone might object that the agent does in fact assume a risk by assisting in the death, some form of psychological scarring and/or memories of killing an infant that will cause them harm should they choose to assist.

Even if I grant this (which I won’t), I don’t believe the two harms are even remotely comparable. Scarring memories from killing a child (that likely would want to die, but I won’t visit this issue) and their associated psychological distress is NOT comparable to the physical agony that Hendriks would be forced to endure for years should the doctors choose not to act. Choosing not to act, even if the choice is grounded in risk analysis, would be selfish, as the risk associated is not comparable to the harm that currently exists.

In some cases, at least, we can say that patients unable to do so themselves have a right to the assistance of others for their death.

Erroneous Idioms: “It takes two to tango”

When taken absolutely literally, I suppose this saying isn’t untrue. I can’t attest to that, as I don’t dance, and now have a funny image in my head of someone tango-ing by themselves.

I imagine the way this saying is most frequently used is in relation to altercations of some kind. When someone says “It takes two to tango,” they often mean to insinuate that a fight between two people needs two willing participants who intended and willfully got into that fight (hopefully I’m fairly representing the usage, any straw-man is unintentional).

 

As always, it shouldn’t take much thinking to realize what bullshit this is.

First of all, ladies, if anyone ever tries to tell you in relation to domestic violence that “you must have done something to provoke him,” “it takes two to tango,” or worse, “you must have done something to deserve it,” you have my permission to punch them in the throat. Physical violence is never deserved. Not only that, but domestic violence is an obvious example of “fights” with unwilling participants.

Even outside of domestic violence, there are some people in this world who do actively look for violence, and try to initiate it when they can. It starts to sound like a victim blaming practice the more you think about it. Is the mugging victim guilty of tango-ing with their mugger?

It doesn’t always “take two to tango.” Don’t let anyone try to use this corrupted rationale on you.

Shitty Advice: Walt Disney

I’m going to be starting a new series on shitty advice, this being the first post in the category. I’ll be covering shitty advice I’ve received, overheard, or read, from people I know and from famous quotations.

This first post will focus on the latter. Here it is, from animator Walt Disney:

“When you believe in a thing, believe in it all the way, implicitly and unquestionably.” – Walt Disney

Now the reason I have a bone to pick with this quotation should be fairly obvious: it basically goes against everything I and this shoddy blog stand for. Unless you live in Disneyland where everything is magic and rainbows and unicorns, unquestioning belief is a dangerous thing.

It doesn’t even take much analysis to see why this is, really shitty advice. I mean, have you ever argued with someone who believes something unquestionably? I think there’s a word for that, or a few words for that. Stubborn, pigheaded, extremist, close-minded, shallow, and ignorant, among other things. Here’s my counter offer.

“Never believe anything unquestionably, unless its negation is a logical impossibility.” – Me.

Short of the cogito reasoning, there isn’t much you should believe unquestionably. You should always remain open minded and be willing to hear the opposition’s arguments and challenges to your beliefs, otherwise you’ll never know when you’re wrong. Openness is key to learning and advancement, and as I’ve said everywhere on this blog, THAT’S what I’m after, and what we all ought to be after.

I’ll leave you with another counter offer from Buddha that has been living on my desk in magnet form for the last (at least) 4 years.

“Believe nothing, no matter where you read, it or who said it, no matter if I have said it, unless it agrees with your own reason and your own common sense.” – Buddha